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Europe’s Sustainability  
Strategy - A Casualty of the 
Euro Crisis or an Ambitious 
Restart? 
Europe’s economy should not just grow, it should also  
target social inclusion and the responsible use of resources. 
The goal of sustainability may be embedded in the Treaty on 
European Union and the EU’s economic strategies, but the 
emphasis on GDP growth and competitiveness in battling 
the crisis threatens to undermine efforts to establish a  
common approach for sustainable economic activity. This 
may be unavoidable during an acute crisis. But in the long 
term, the EU must show the way forward.  
 
Focus  
Global processes of social change, shifting 
economic power, political upheaval, and 
economic and financial crises each present 
Europe with a variety of challenges.  
A sustainable Europe needs a strategy that 
facilitates economic strength and political 
stability while guaranteeing the viability of 
social and environmental systems. These 
objectives must be conceived with the 
needs of current and future generations in 
mind. 
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1. Time for a new  
approach 
Since Maastricht, the EU has committed it-
self to the concept of development an-
chored in long-term objectives. To achieve 
this, it developed its own sustainability 
strategy, the EU Sustainable Development 
Strategy (EU SDS) in 2001. A decade later, 
it integrated key features of sustainable de-
velopment into its ten-year growth  
strategy, Europe 2020. And though both 
strategies bear considerable potential, they 
have lost traction in practice. In order to re-
vitalize both, the EU must harmonize them. 
Indeed, the effects of the ongoing euro  
crisis demonstrate the need to place envi-
ronmental, economic and social objectives 
on equal footing in driving Europe’s eco-
nomic strength. 
 
2. EU SDS and Europe 2020 
– a stock-taking 
Issued in 2001, the EU’s first sustainability 
strategy was in many ways a more reason-
able complement to the economic plan put 
forth by the EU at the time. The EU regu-
larly enacts programs of several years’  
duration as a means to achieving its eco-
nomic policy objectives. The Lisbon Strat-
egy, also known as the Lisbon Process, was 
in place until 2010. It was supposed to 
make Europe the most competitive and in-
novative region in the world, a goal which 
from today’s perspective appears overly 
ambitious. The EU SDS was created in  
parallel, which meant that two distinct 
strategies were developed: one for eco-
nomic growth; the other for sustainable de-
velopment. The initial EU SDS included 
ideas for improved European policies on  
issues ranging from greenhouse gas emis-
sions to public health care, poverty, dimin-
ishing biodiversity and traffic congestion. It 
was supposed to serve both as a model for 
national plans within the EU and as a flag-
ship for the EU internationally.  
 
The EU SDS faced new competition with 
the launch in 2010 of the EU’s new ten-
year plan, the Europe 2020 strategy. Some-
what slimmer in comparison to its prede-
cessor, the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 
incorporated growth as well as sustainabil-
ity, therefore targeting sustainable growth. 
By emphasizing an integrated concept of 
sustainable growth, Europe 2020 effec-
tively forced the EU’s formally independent 
EU SDS of 2001 into the background. In-
deed, the key objectives of sustainable de-
velopment – reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, using renewable energy 
sources, increasing expenditure for innova-
tion and combatting poverty – are integral 
features of Europe 2020.  
 
Taken together, the EU SDS and the Lisbon 
Strategy were not particularly successful. 
The objective of a 70% employment rate 
was not met. And although more people 
were employed, this failed to reduce  
poverty. Spending for research and devel-
opment also did not, as planned, increase 
much by 2010. Europe also failed to dimin-
ish significantly the productivity gap  
between itself and the United States. So 
there was much to be said for an economic 
strategy that consistently incorporated sus-
tainability while driving growth.  
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Europe 2020’s 
authors sought to 
avoid the mis-
takes of Lisbon 
and took care to 
not overburden 
the strategy. 
Clearly formu-
lated objectives 
for employment, 
innovation, edu-
cation, social in-
clusion, as well as 
climate and en-
ergy issues were 
designed to com-
bat the EU’s most pressing problems. Com-
pared with its predecessor, Europe 2020 is 
leaner and predicated on a more sober as-
sessment of Europe’s position in global eco-
nomic competition. It also acknowledges 
the greater dynamism of  
industrialized and emerging nations out-
side Europe and recognizes that a large 
part of Europe’s growth comes from trading 
with these countries (Fehmel 2013: 22, 
32f). 
 
In terms of social targets, Europe 2020 dis-
tinguishes itself by assigning a high im-
portance to social objectives, with the battle 
against poverty being an equal part of the 
overall strategy. The Lisbon Strategy drew 
a distinction between economic, financial, 
employment and social concerns. It failed 
to articulate social objectives in detail and 
gave member states the freedom to collab-
orate on these issues as it suited them 
(Daly 2012: 275). Europe 2020, by con-
trast, is designed to achieve what advocates 
of sustainable development have long 
called for: making social and environmen-
tal issues axiomatic components of eco-
nomic thinking. 
3. Sustainability tossed by 
the wayside 
Good intentions, no matter how sincere, do 
not necessarily translate into effective im-
pact, as the current crisis demonstrates. 
Policymaking in Brussels currently has lit-
tle room for the objective of sustainable, in-
clusive growth. EU institutions and mem-
ber states target more or less exclusively 
GDP growth, enhanced competitiveness 
and budget reforms. This can be attributed 
in large part to the EU’s stability and re-
form packages which include the instru-
ment for ensuring compliance with the Eu-
rope 2020 objectives: the European Semes-
ter (see box). This instrument is also tasked 
with monitoring economic policy in 28 EU 
member states and measuring the progress 
made on Europe 2020’s five objectives. 
However, the logic driving its oversight  
capacity means that it is designed  
primarily to strengthen EU stability mech-
anisms and monitor public finances. In 
fact, of the recommendations issued by the  
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European Commission through the Euro-
pean Semester, only those relating to fiscal 
policy are enforceable. 
Putting issues of sustainability and social 
inclusion on equal footing in the Europe 
2020 strategy doesn’t mean that they are 
afforded equal weight in practice. A look at 
the EU’s financing instruments, for exam-
ple, shows that sociopolitical measures, 
apart from the structural funds supporting 
Europe’s weaker regions, play only a minor 
role (cf. Daly 2012). Furthermore, Europe 
2020 is not a binding strategy for the EU 
and can be superseded by individual fiscal 
policy agreements. 
 
For the EU’s sustainability objectives, this 
bears some risks. Demands for lower 
wages, for example, could make the battle 
against poverty more difficult. Work alone, 
as the OECD warns, doesn’t necessarily 
rescue people from poverty. Prescribed 
austerity can also run counter to the de-
clared goal of making Europe more compet-
itive (without a price war) as a location for 
innovation. This, after all, often requires 
public spending. The International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) has also admitted that the 
consequences of prescribed consolidation 
for states in crisis, such as rising unem-
ployment and falling demand, have been 
significantly underestimated (cf. Thillaye 
2011: 14f.). 
 
Overall, the prospects for achieving Europe 
2020’s sustainability targets are dim.  
According to experts, education targets 
have the greatest 
chance of success. It 
is, however, unlikely 
that the EU will 
reach the targeted 
3% in research and 
development spend-
ing. In fact, the Euro-
pean Commission 
has already called on  
industry to contrib-
ute more in this area 
since member states 
have reduced re-
search expenditures 
in the EU budget. 
Targeted employ-
ment rates also seem 
far-fetched. And fi-
nally, efforts among 
member states to im-
prove their energy 
efficiency are weak 
(cf. Gros/Roth 2012). 
 
4. Lack of influence 
So how should we move forward? Accord-
ing to the European Commission, Europe 
2020 functions well, despite everything. 
Their view is that the European Semester 
suffices as supervisory authority and guar-
antor in ensuring that Europe develops in a 
sustainable manner (cf. Council of the  
The European Semester 
 
The European Semester for coordinating EU economic and fiscal 
policy planning was introduced in 2011 as part of the Europe 
2020 strategy. It carries out the following tasks on an annual 
basis:  
• the European Commission presents at the beginning of  
   the year its Annual Growth Survey;  
• the European Council meets in March to provide  
   orientation for economic policymaking;  
• member states submit their reform plans, receive  
   recommendations from the Commission and integrate  
   these into their draft budgets;  
• the Annual Growth Survey assesses implementation. 
 
The European Semester is tasked with monitoring, among other 
things, whether member states are targeting Europe 2020’s five 
core objectives with regards to sustainable and inclusive growth. 
It is, however, an instrument designed primarily to monitor 
budgetary discipline and economic performance. 
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European Union 2012). This line of think-
ing further maintains that the integrated 
sustainability objectives of Europe 2020 
render a separate strategy obsolete. The  
review and revision of the old EU SDS 
which would now be due, is also redundant.  
 
Not everyone reads the situation this way. 
A number of member states are committed 
to an initiative put forward by Germany 
and Austria which would revise, and revi-
talize, the 2001 EU SDS. The strategy has 
already been revised by the European Com-
mission in 2005 and 2009. The European 
Council later confirmed that the EU SDS 
would remain the overarching framework 
for EU policies and strategies. While mem-
ber states were keen to link it more closely 
with the Europe 2020 strategy where pos-
sible, they had no desire to replace it. The 
EU SDS is supposed to be reviewed every 
two years by the Commission. In October 
2012, the EU Environment Council conse-
quently called on the European Commis-
sion to achieve this by 2014 at the latest. 
This suited the ministers as the previous 
summer saw the United Nations Confer-
ence on Sustainable Development (i.e., 
Rio+20), which was intended to reinvigor-
ate political commitment to sustainable de-
velopment. However, in a protocol declara-
tion the Commission responded that it did 
not think much of the idea of revising the 
strategy (cf. Council of the European Union 
2012).  
 
In short, the EU’s sustainability programs 
are currently paper tigers which have little 
influence on the course of current political 
decision-making. The general opinion in 
Brussels is that the existing Commission 
won’t be undertaking any further revision 
of the old EU SDS, with its term coming to 
an end next year. The EU’s five core objec-
tives from the Europe 2020 strategy are go-
ing nowhere and it now looks unlikely that 
they will be revised in 2014 as originally 
planned. 
5. First pragmatic, then 
ambitious 
Presently, there is little point in insisting 
on a revision of the 2001 EU SDS and  
Europe 2020. Firstly, the time strictures of 
the current Commission render this super-
fluous. Secondly, formulating major goals 
achieves nothing if they find no resonance 
in the current political situation and serve 
only to salve the consciences of political  
actors. 
 
That doesn’t mean that the EU can shelve 
its sustainability goals. Rather it should 
carefully consider how to maintain this 
new dynamic and how it might best be in-
tegrated into the political process. The  
following approaches could help achieve 
this:  
 
Europe 2020 and the EU SDS should no 
longer be revised discretely, rather they 
should be prioritized and negotiated as a 
package by the incoming European Com-
mission. In this way, the objectives of the 
various strategies can be adapted to each 
other and to prevailing conditions. With 
these processes underway, Europe could 
then make a timely contribution to the 
post-2015 agenda, the globally applicable 
regulatory framework for the era after 
2015. That’s when the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals of the United Nations elapse, 
meaning the world will require a new de-
velopment plan. 
 
Synchronizing the various objectives is the 
key. The agenda of Europe 2020 should 
consider current GDP growth goals which 
reflect the impact of the crisis. If required, 
the five most important objectives could 
even be moderated. Even if this looks like a 
setback on paper, there is at least a chance 
for ensuring the relevance of Europe 2020 
goals. The target of 2020 remains in place. 
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The goals for the post-2020 era are consid-
erably more ambitious, but nonetheless 
correspond with pre-2020 targets. Here, a 
revised EU SDS would be appropriate. 
While the EU reformulates its goals, at the 
same time it can ensure that they form part 
of the United Nations’ post-2015 agenda. 
The term of the EU SDS should be synchro-
nized with that of the UN agenda for the 
post-2015 era. That means that when the 
United Nations begins to take stock, it is 
also then time for a further revision of the 
updated EU SDS.  
 
6. Conclusion 
European initiatives for greater economic, 
environmental and social sustainability 
have set significant objectives. And they 
have attempted to integrate them into the 
economic reasoning of the EU. The current 
crisis has brought this approach to its lim-
its. The pursuit of GDP growth and compet-
itiveness are superimposed over every-
thing else. Realistically, little more is likely 
to happen under the current European 
Commission. But the incoming Commis-
sion should once more declare sustainabil-
ity a priority so that it also gets a say in 
shaping the United Nations’ post-millen-
nium goals. The issue here is not whether 
the EU SDS or the new Europe 2020 strat-
egy presents the better framework. The EU 
must revise both as a package, coordinate 
one with the other and adapt them to  
current conditions. The goals of the Europe 
2020 strategy could be moderated some-
what to avoid missing the boat during the 
GDP-oriented crisis management phase. It 
should seamlessly connect with the revised 
EU SDS. Its goals would be significantly 
more ambitious. And with them, the EU 
could play a part in shaping United Nations 
development goals for the post-2015 era. 
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Policy Brief 2013/04: Who Benefits from a Transatlan-
tic Free Trade Agreement? 
From a purely economic standpoint, the US and the entire 
EU will profit from a dismantling of tariffs and non-tariff 
trade barriers between both regions. The real gross domes-
tic product per capita would increase in the US and in all 
27 EU member countries. Also when one looks at labor 
markets, the positive effects on employment predominate. 
The public welfare gains of these economies admittedly do 
stand in contrast with real losses in income and employ-
ment in the rest of the world. On balance, however, the 
beneficial effects on economic welfare prevail. 
 
Policy Brief 2013/05: Federal States, Industries and Ed-
ucation Level – Effects of TTIP in Germany 
All major industries and states would benefit from a 
transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP). 
The greatest manufacturing and employment effects 
would be seen in the electronics and metal processing 
industries. Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and North 
Rhine-Westphalia would benefit most. Furthermore, it 
becomes apparent that new jobs would be created for 
all education groups – even for relatively unskilled 
workers.  
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